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Open access under CC BYInfrastructures are becoming increasingly interconnected and it is essential to develop models that
account for interdependencies between infrastructure systems at different scales. This paper presents a
network model designed to achieve this, aimed at a local scale. Infrastructure systems are considered as
a network. Vertices, which represent processes of production, consumption, transhipment and storage
of resources (commodities), are connected by edges that capture commodity ﬂows. Optimal performance
of the network under normal and extreme conditions may be found by minimising the cost of commodity
ﬂow. The model is described, and the performance of interdependent infrastructure systems (energy,
water and wastewater) during ﬂoods is demonstrated, using Monte Carlo simulation. The advantages
and limitations of the model are considered before future developments are outlined.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
The proper performance of infrastructure is essential for sup-
porting security, economic prosperity and social well-being, partic-
ularly in industrial societies like the UK. However, achieving this is,
and will continue to be, a difﬁcult challenge. The present UK infra-
structure is subject to ever increasing loads due to population
growth and suffers from deterioration, which makes it more vul-
nerable (ICE, 2010). In addition, the infrastructure must adapt to
climate change; weather-related hazards, such as ﬂoods and heat-
waves, are projected to increase in frequency and intensity
(UKCP09). These events can damage energy and water supply,
transport, communication routes and other infrastructure systems.
Therefore, it is essential todevelopefﬁcient strategies for improv-
ing infrastructure resilience, andensure continuousandreliableper-
formance in the future. Numerical models that simulate
infrastructure performance may signiﬁcantly assist in the develop-
ment of such strategies. However, in order to provide a realistic pre-
diction of the performance of various infrastructure systems,
especially when they are subject to weather-related hazards, it is
important to account for interdependencies, i.e., when failure in one
system may cause severe disruptions and/or failures in other
systems.
In this paperwepresent anextended, network-ﬂowapproachde-
signed to simulate the performance of systems with infrastructural
interdependencies. Nodes represent physical infrastructure assets,
and associated processes of production, consumption, transhipment
and storage of commodities (e.g., water, wastewater, electricity); license.electricity substations, water treatment works, water pumping sta-
tionsandroad intersectionsareexamplesof suchassets. Theedgesof
the network model assets associated with the ﬂow/movement of
commodities between nodes; e.g. power transmission, water and
wastewater pipelines, or roads. The model allows optimisation of
infrastructure performance byminimising the total operational cost
associated with production, storage and commodity ﬂow. This can
be done under normal and extreme/hazardous conditions. A high
node resolution, compared to typical models of national infrastruc-
tures, is intended to capture assets at local scaleswhere, e.g., storage
facilities and emergency generators become very important. To ac-
count for the damage of assets, parameters describing the assets
can be treated as random variables.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an
overview of existing infrastructure models, placing particular
emphasis on the modelling of infrastructural interdependencies.
Section 3 presents the mathematical formulation as a standard
form linear program. Probabilistic analysis of interdependent infra-
structure systems, using the model in the context of Monte Carlo
simulation, and a simple example problem, is then presented in
section 4. We discuss the model (Section 5) and plans for its future
development (Section 6), before concluding the paper.
2. Infrastructure modelling
There are many different ways to classify infrastructure models.
In the context of this paper, it may be useful to distinguish be-
tween two kinds: (1) those concerned with a particular, individual
infrastructure system (e.g., power, water or transport); and (2)
those that consider interdependencies between different infrastruc-
ture systems.
Nomenclature
General, graph-theoretic notation
k current commodity: k 2 {1,2, . . . ,K}
K the number of modelled infrastructures: k 2 {1,2, . . . ,K}
G(E, V); the set of vertices and edges
V the set of vertices
E the set of edges
e(i, j) edge connecting vertex i to vertex j
i used for current and origin vertex
j used for other and terminal vertex
ci k the set of links that carry commodity k that are incom-
ing to node i
ci!k the set of links that carry commodity k that are outgoing
from node i
Set of constants in the model, i.e., those parameters whose values are
deﬁned by input data/values
f emaxk maximum ﬂow rate of commodity k on edge e
pimaxk maximum production rate of commodity k at node i
ji k requirement of commodity k at node i
ain;k coefﬁcient relating the production of commodity k at
node i to corresponding consumption rate of commod-
ity n at node i
ximaxk maximum capacities for storage of commodity k at node
i
xikð0Þ stored commodity k at node i at initial time (t = 0). As
the solution progress in time this constant is replaced
by xikðt  DtÞ ¼ xik – the amounts of stored commodi-
ties at the previous time step
xik the amount of storage of commodity k at node i in the
previous time-step, i.e., compressed notation for
xikðt  DtÞ
cfek costs of the ﬂow of commodity k on edge e
cxik costs of the storage of commodity k at node i
cpik costs of the production of commodity k at node i
c/ik costs of the discharge of commodity k at node i
ckik costs of the shortage of commodity k at node i
C total cost (function to be minimised)
Set of variables in the model, i.e., those parameters whose values are
deﬁned in the objective function
f ek ﬂow rate of commodity k on edge e
jikn consumption (uptake) rates of commodity k, at node i,
for the production of commodity n at node i, such that
where n – k
pikk production (creation) rate of commodity k at node i.
This is commodity that does not require any uptake of
other commodity kinds to produce it
kik unsatisﬁed demand (shortage) rate of commodity k at
node i
f i k in-ﬂow rate of commodity k at node i
f i!k out-ﬂow rate of commodity k at node i
pik production rate of commodity k at node i
jik consumption rate of commodity k at node i
sik storage rate of change of commodity k at node i
/ik discharge rate of commodity k at node i
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Individual infrastructure systems are usually described mathe-
matically as networks that contain vertices (or nodes) and edges
(or links), the elementary objects of graph theory (Wilson, 1996).
Network representations underpin many modelling approaches
to infrastructure systems. In the current context, vertices typically
represent localised assets (e.g. water towers or pumping stations,
electricity nodes) that are connected by edges (e.g. water pipes
or transmission lines, etc.).
When a model is intended to be applied to the design and/or
management of an infrastructure, it is usually formulated as an
optimisation problem. The objective function can be associated
with the allocation of resources, for example: of various energy
sources to various demand patterns (Tan, 2011); of ﬂows in order
to minimise overﬂow and maintain balance within wastewater
systems subject to inhomogeneous rainfall (Burkhard, 2000); or
of water supply within the constraints of a given drainage basin
(Hsu, 2002); to name a few.
Accurate simulation typically requires solution of a nonlinear
problem. For example, alternating currents (AC) in an electrical
network are described by a system of nonlinear equations (Wang
et al., 2008), as are the ﬂows and pressures in water supply net-
works, which can also be solved as a nonlinear optimisation prob-
lem (Collins et al., 1978). Solutions of nonlinear problems often
require time-consuming, iterative techniques that do not always
converge. These physically accurate, non-linear formulations, are
therefore often simpliﬁed by linear approximations, especially
when large-scale networks are being analysed; examples include
the direct current (DC) load ﬂow model for AC electrical networks
(Wang et al., 2008), and a linear programming algorithm for anal-
ysis of water pipe networks (Berghout and Kuczera, 1997).Although these linear models provide quite accurate predictions
of the performance of individual infrastructures, they require de-
tails of network-speciﬁc information (e.g., admittances of power
lines, diameters of water pipes, etc.). Therefore, the same model
cannot be used to capture different infrastructure networks (e.g.,
power and water).
Analysis of infrastructure networks can be further simpliﬁed by
the use of network ﬂow models (Ahuja et al., 1993). Such models
only ensure ﬂow continuity at nodes, while physical laws govern-
ing the ﬂow of commodities within infrastructure systems are not
fully satisﬁed. However, the accuracy of these models is acceptable
(e.g., for the optimisation and planning of power and water sys-
tems) and they continue to be used (e.g., Padiyar and Shanbhaq,
1988; Sun et al., 1995; Manca et al., 2010). Furthermore, a major
advantage of network ﬂow models is that a single mathematical
formulation can describe ﬂows of commodities in different infra-
structure systems, e.g., power, water, gas, transport networks.
One the other hand, because network ﬂow models do not fully sat-
isfy physical laws they may not be appropriate for simulating the
effect of local failures and disruptions, and associated overloads,
on the performance of neighbouring components. Consequently,
they are not useful for examining failure propagation (i.e., cascad-
ing failure) in individual systems (e.g., in power transmission net-
works). Moreover, using network ﬂow models for the analysis of
large-scale infrastructure networks may be time-consuming and
this further complicates their use in the assessment of vulnerabil-
ity of such networks.
Alternatively, complex networkmodels, which have less empha-
sis on optimisation, have targeted these kinds of behaviours by
examining the role of connectivity in large-scale networks, such
as power grids (Wang and Rong, 2009; Duenas-Osorio and Vem-
uru, 2009), transport topologies (Doménech, 2009; Sun, 2009),
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neous network topologies amenable to multilayer network
descriptions (Tsirakakis and Clarkson, 2009). Empirical work sup-
ports the idea that it is often the topology in large-scale systems
that matters, not necessarily processes at the node. For example,
the high degrees of complexity in systems such as the world-wide
web deeply affect network functionality (Broder et al., 2000).
Therefore, another important concept that can be explored by such
models is resilience, where this means the ability of an infrastruc-
ture to recover from failure while delivering a service; topology
is important in complex network approaches because it has the po-
tential capacity to hold a network together when it is ‘under attack’
(i.e., subject to a disruptive event).
The resilience of individual infrastructures can also be investi-
gated by system dynamic methods. Here, system behaviour is de-
scribed by linear, dynamic models, i.e., sets of ﬁrst-order linear
ordinary differential equations (ODEs) that relate system states over
time. The problem is formulated in the context of optimal feedback
control, such that control (input) variables can be used to represent
recovery efforts. For example, the approach has been employed to
assess resilience of infrastructure systems by taking into account
the recovery costs (Vurgin and Camphouse, 2011). The practical
implementation of such methods requires a large amount of data
about system states and their relationships, and analyses may be
computationally inefﬁcient, especially for large-scale networks.2.2. Modelling infrastructure interdependencies
Modern infrastructure systems are highly interdependent in the
sense that failures in one infrastructure can propagate, causing fail-
ures at nodes or edges considered to belong to a ‘separate’ system.
Therefore, studying infrastructure systems in isolation may not
provide adequate information about performance. Rinaldi et al.
(2001) deﬁne four categories of infrastructure interdependencies:
(1) geographical; (2) physical; (3) cyber; and (4) logical. Geographic
dependencies refer to infrastructure assets ‘linked’ by proximity.
Physical relationships refer to physically-connected assets. For
example, a water pumping station (a water network asset) de-
pends on electricity supplied by an electricity substation (an elec-
tricity network asset) to function. Cyber relationships refer to
dependencies between infrastructure sectors that are connected
via the internet. Logical relationships are more abstract; they
might refer to the ‘connection’ between various ﬁnancial state vari-
ables, or human behaviour. A review by Pederson et al. (2006), and
reports on the UK ﬂoods of 2007 (Pitt, 2008), contain related con-
ceptual discussions of infrastructures with the aim of organising
knowledge schematically to help make sense of the complexity
seen in such inter-related systems.
A methodology for the assessment of infrastructure interdepen-
dencies, and associated with them cascading failures, has been pro-
posed by Franchina et al. (2011). This is a high-level, qualitative
approach to assess the criticality of different infrastructures, based
on the eventual impact of failures on quality of life. Another high-
level, but quantitative, approach to modelling infrastructure inter-
dependencies is based on the Leontief input–output model of equi-
librium in regional and national-scale economies (Leontief, 1951).
The use of the Leontief model to analyse interconnections between
various infrastructure sectors was initially proposed by Haimes
and Jiang (2001). The model is a system of linear equations that
connect the inoperability of infrastructure sectors (i.e., inability
to produce as-planned) with demand perturbations through an
interdependency matrix. The model has been further developed
(e.g., Haimes et al., 2005a, 2005b) and extended to include a prob-
abilistic formulation of uncertainties associated with estimated de-
mand perturbations (Barker and Haimes, 2009; Xu et al., 2012).This high-level approach considers sector interdependencies and
component-level detail is not represented explicitly.
Agent-based modelling is often used to simulate infrastructure
interdependencies (Pederson et al., 2006; Ghorbani and Bagheri,
2008). In agent-based modelling, the actions (and interactions) of
agents are deﬁned by simple sets of rules. By deﬁnition these are of-
ten coded at an individual level, but aggregated via simulations in
which rules and patterns of interaction can be seen to develop over
time. In principle, this approach allows any level of reﬁnement (sca-
lability) depending on the agent deﬁnition. In this way, infrastruc-
tures are viewed as communities of interacting agents (physical
assets and decision-making entities) and behave, together, as a
complex adaptive system (Rinaldi et al., 2001; Brown et al., 2004;
van der Lei et al., 2010). It has been also suggested that combining
ABMat the level of a single infrastructurewith the High Level Archi-
tecture (HLA) simulation standard can facilitate the interoperability
of multiple-type models and simulations (Eusgeld et al., 2011). The
level of detail included is often very ﬁne, i.e., thousands of agents
are often required. Thismakes suchmodels computationally expen-
sive. Another disadvantage is that input parameters map to model
behaviour, which is typically said to emerge, in complex ways; the
danger is that the usefulness of abstraction is lost.
Some of the network-based models described in the previous
section have also been applied to the analysis of infrastructure
interdependencies. For large-scale examples, the emphasis has
been placed on vulnerability, which has been examined through
topological analysis (e.g., Ouyang and Duenas-Osorio, 2011; Wang
et al., 2012). A number of extensions to the traditional network ﬂow
model have also been proposed. For example, in order to model
infrastructure systems subject to disruptions, when the total supply
of a commodity can be less than its total demand, Lee et al. (2007)
introduce slack variables to a model that uses node types (supply,
demand and transhipment) based on the traditional network ﬂow
model. Slack variables represent the shortfall in meeting demand
at nodes and corresponding weighting factors are set for the cost
of unmet demand. Individual infrastructures are modelled by sepa-
rate networks and additional variables connecting interdependent
nodes are therefore introduced. Time-invariance requires that any
change in network state is given by a new set of input data, which
needs to be prepared before a new iteration. This model has been
applied to the analysis of an infrastructure system supplying a hos-
pital during a disaster event (Arboleda et al., 2009). Svendsen and
Wolthusen (2007) propose a conceptual network ﬂow model with
multifunctional nodes, where a general node acts as a consumer
and a producer, and also represents changing storage. Time thus re-
quires explicit consideration, which is achieved by considering net-
work states at discrete time points. These additions are appropriate
for systems that have become damaged and exploit storage capac-
ities during recovery time, although it should be noted that to the
best of our knowledge the model is not fully detailed and example
analysis deals only with topological analysis.
An interesting model, including the simulator I2Sim, was pre-
sented by Rahman et al. (2011). The authors call it a cell-channel
model, where interdependencies between infrastructures are de-
scribed using an extended Leontief input–output model (see
above). We mention the model here because it has similarities
with the model proposed by Svendsen and Wolthusen (2007); a
cell is very similar to a multi-functional node; a ‘channel’ is an
edge; commodities are referred to as ‘tokens’; and simulations
are carried out at discrete time.
Finally, for the purposes of this paper we chose to distinguish
between individual interdependent infrastructure models, although
various reviews that contain alternative classiﬁcations, and more
inclusive discussion, can be found elsewhere (Pederson et al.,
2006; Ghorbani and Bagheri, 2008; Xiao et al., 2008; Griot, 2010;
Satumtira and Dueñas-Osorio, 2010).
Fig. 1. Elements of the model: each node, connected to other nodes by edges, has a
number of associated properties.
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3.1. General network description
The model developed in this study is intended to simulate the
operation of interdependent infrastructure systems at the local
(community) scale, under normal and extreme (i.e., when the
infrastructure assets are damaged) conditions. The model takes
into account uncertainties associated with the performance of
damaged assets by treating relevant parameters as random vari-
ables. In order to be suitable for probabilistic analysis the model
needs to be computationally efﬁcient.
The model description contains graph-theoretic notation. Again,
edges represent interactions between vertices. For example, edges
can be power lines, water pipes, roads, etc., whereas vertices can be
power plants, water treatment plants, railway stations, etc. It is as-
sumed that any directed edge e(i, j) deﬁnes an interaction between
vertex i and j. For example, an electricity power station might sup-
ply a substation that in turn supplies a water pumping station. In
this way, when we consider a number of connections between dif-
ferent vertices, edges often connect together various assets such
that a path is formed from a source vertex to a consumption vertex.
For example, a source vertex might be a power plant that delivers
electricity to a consumption vertex (a house or hospital, etc.) via a
number of intermediate edges.
Although the scope of the model is restricted to the community
scale, it may be necessary to ignore administrative/geographical
boundaries, if important supply vertices are located outside the
modelled area. In other words, in order to allow important supply
vertices to be included, the boundaries of the modelled infrastruc-
ture need not be entirely contained within the geographical
boundaries of a chosen community.
In order to model a set of different infrastructures we deﬁne a
digraph G(E, V), where E is the set of directed edges of the form
e(i, j) and V is the set of vertices. Vertex i has a neighbourhood
C(i) # G containing vertices adjacent to i. It is useful also to distin-
guish between edges e(i, j) coming into i and the edges e(j, i) leav-
ing i – we label these as c # C and c? # C, respectively. Edges
are similar to those deﬁned in standard network ﬂows approaches
(Ahuja et al., 1993; Lee et al., 2007). However, in contrast to these
standard approaches, vertices are deﬁned in a general way to
accommodate function-speciﬁc asset types, similarly to the mul-
ti-functional node model proposed by Svendsen and Wolthusen
(2007). Instead of supply and demand vertices, which are typical
in the standard approaches, we introduce additional processes of
production, consumption and storage to the node, whereas tran-
shipment remains the same as standard approaches. Moreover, a
single vertex represents all these functions, in a general way. This
means that a commodity can be supplied from one vertex to the
next by being taken from storage. Similarly, a commodity can be
consumed in order to produce another commodity or simply to
satisfy a demand. To simulate the operation of damaged infrastruc-
ture it is necessary to deal with unsatisﬁed demand. Following Lee
et al. (2007), a variable representing shortfall (or shortage) is intro-
duced, along with the corresponding cost (or penalty).
It is expected that there will be uncertainties associated with
damage caused by hazards. To take this into account, various
parameters related to the infrastructure operation (e.g., ﬂow
capacities of edges, production capacities of vertices) can be trea-
ted as random variables.
Finally, in order to describe different kinds of commodities (e.g.,
water, electricity, gas) associated with different infrastructure
systems, we say that there are K commodities such that k:
k 2 {1,2, . . . ,K}. Some of the deﬁnitions introduced above are illus-
trated in Fig. 1.3.2. Consideration of time factor
The formulation presented below is given for a single point in
time t. The solution starts at t = t0, a network under normal condi-
tions. Time progresses in incrementsDt that do not need to be con-
stant and can thereby simulate the performance of the network as it
is being damaged then restored. However, all variables and con-
stants remain unchanged within a time step. This approach to time
dependency is similar to those in (Svendsen and Wolthusen, 2007;
Rahman et al., 2011). Note: mathematically it is necessary that vari-
ables change during the solution (or search) process, although the
ﬁnal solution gives the optimal values of variables for that time step.
It is also important to note that minimising the total costs sepa-
rately at each time step does not give an optimal solution for the
network performance over the entire period. For example, when a
network is under normal conditions it is obvious that the optimal
amount of storage is zero; if everything works properly there is no
need for stored commodities because storage incurs additional cost.
However,when thenetwork is damaged by a hazard, the availability
of commodities from storage may reduce the total cost (since there
are additional high costs penalising unsatisﬁed demand). In order to
take this into account we can set artiﬁcially negative costs for stor-
age (to prevent the use of stored commodities under normal condi-
tions) or minimise the total cost over all the considered time steps,
i.e., the objective function should be the sum of the costs associated
with each time step. The second approach seems better. In order to
use this approach we need to know the time required for restoring
the network to its original undamaged conditions and very often
this cannot be predicted with certainty.
3.3. Description of processes at a node
A number of variables ðf ekpikkjikn, kik) relate processes concerning
commodity k at node i. These variables are the ﬂow of commodity k
on edge e, denoted f ek , the production of a commodity k at node i,
denoted pikk, the consumption of commodity k for the production
of commodity n, denoted jikn, and the shortage of commodity k
at node i, denoted kik. The variable k
i
k representing shortage is thus
similar to the slack variable introduced by Lee et al. (2007).
We now explain relations between these variables and their
associated constants. We consider, in turn, the three aspects at the
node: (a) in-ﬂow, and out-ﬂow, (b) consumption, and (c) production.
3.3.1. Flow
In-ﬂow rates to vertex i are given by f i k ¼
P
e2c 
i
f ek and outﬂow
rates by f i!k ¼
P
e2c!
i
f ek where c
 and c? are the incoming and out-
going edges of i, respectively.
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The consumption rate is summarised as:
jik ¼ jik;k þ
X
n–k
jik;n ð1Þ
where two kinds of consumption are deﬁned by the ﬁrst and sec-
ond terms in the right-hand-side. In the ﬁrst right-hand-side term,
commodity k is simply digested jik;k ¼ ji k  kik on the basis of need
ji k , which is unmet if there is a shortage k
i
k. In the second term,
there is straightforward uptake jik;n of commodity k as raw material
in production of commodity n. Thus, consumption rate is deﬁned
as:
jik ¼ ji k  kik þ
X
n–k
jik;n ð2Þ3.3.3. Production
The production rate is summarised as pik ¼ pikk þ
P
n–kpink such
that two kinds of production are deﬁned by the ﬁrst and second
terms in the right-hand-side. The ﬁrst right-hand-side term is the
creation pik;k of a commodity where required consumables are
undeﬁned in ci – i.e., for supply nodes. In the second manufacture
pin;k ¼ ain;kjin;k is the rate of production of commodity k that con-
sumes commodity n. Note, we assume that production rate is lin-
early proportional to consumption rate, ensuring compatibility
with the standard form of linear optimisation problem (see below).
Thus, production rate is:
pik ¼ pik;k þ
X
n–k
ain;kj
i
n;k ð3Þ
The relationships of the processes at the node are illustrated at
two levels of depth, one more schematic and the other related to
the in-text equations (see Fig. 2).Fig. 2. Top: schematic showing the overall processes associated with th3.4. Node balance and other general constraints
The balance equation for a node is formulated as:
ðf i k  f i!k Þ þ ðpik  jikÞ  ðsik þ /ikÞ ¼ 0 ð4Þ
where the third term is the rate of unbalanced ﬂow occurring in
storage (sik) or that discharged (/
i
k). Substituting Eqs. (2) and (3) into
Eq. (4) gives:
ðf i k  f i!k Þ þ pikk þ
X
n–k
ainkj
i
nk ji k þ kik 
X
n–k
jikn
 !
 ðsik þ/ikÞ ¼ 0
ð5Þ
It is assumed that a commodity must be discharged only when
its storage capacity at the node is exceeded. This leads to another
general constraint:
xik þ sikDt þ /ikDt P xi;maxk ð6Þ
where xik is the amount of stored commodity at the previous time-
step, i.e., xik ¼ xikðt  DtÞ, as mentioned above, and xi;maxk the max-
imum storage capacity.
The standard form for a linear optimisation problem, Eq. (10),
determines that only variables multiplied by constant coefﬁcients
should be in the left hand side of a general constraint. Thus, Eq.
(5) is re-written as:
ðf i k  f i!k Þ þ pikk þ
X
n–k
ainkj
i
nk þ kik 
X
n–k
jikn
 !
 ðsik þ /ikÞ ¼ ji k
ð7Þ
and Eq. (6) as:
sik þ /ik P
xi;maxk xik
Dt
ð8Þe node. Bottom: schematic relating the processes to the equations.
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charge even when the storage in not full (i.e., it may be discharged
more than required in order not to overﬁll the storage capacity). It
will depend on the relation between the cost of storage and the
cost of discharge. If the latter is larger than the cost of storage, then
unnecessary discharge should not occur.
Finally, the production of the commodity k at node i cannot ex-
ceed its limit, (pi;maxk ). This determines another general constraint:
pik;k þ
X
m–k
aim;kj
i
m;k 6 p
i;max
k ð9Þ3.5. Formulation of optimisation problem
The model presented below will be formulated according to the
structure of the standard form of a linear optimisation problem:
min
x2Rn
c0x
s:t: : bl 6 Ax 6 bu ðgeneral constraintsÞ
xl 6 x 6 xu ðbounds on variablesÞ
ð10Þ
where x is the vector of variables, c is the objective coefﬁcient vec-
tor (in our case, costs), A is the coefﬁcient matrix, and the vectors bl,
bu, xl and xu are lower and upper bounds on the constraints and the
variables, respectively.
As should be clear from this formulation, the constraints
should be expressed only in terms of the variables appearing
in the objective function. This means that, if the total cost (i.e.,
objective function) depends on discharge and unsatisﬁed de-
mand (see below), then variables representing these quantities
should be in the constraints. Moreover, all constants except for
the coefﬁcients of the matrix A should be moved into the
bounds.
3.5.1. Objective function and constraints: general case
The total cost C at a given point in time t can be expressed as
C ¼
X
e2E
cfek f
e
k þ
X
i2V
cxik
1
2
ððxikðtÞ þxikðt  DtÞÞ þ
X
i2V
cpik p
i
k
þ
X
i2V
c/ik /
i
k þ
X
i2V
ckik k
i
k;8k 2 K ð11Þ
where the terms from one to ﬁve represent costs associated with
ﬂow, storage, production, discharge and shortage, respectively. Note
that the cost of storage is based on the average amount of stored
commodity within the time interval (t  Dt, t), where the storage
xikðtÞ for the kth commodity at the ith node is:
xikðtÞ ¼ xikðt  DtÞ þ sikDt 6 xi;maxk ð12Þ
Substituting Eq. (12) for the second term of Eq. (11) givesP
cxik xiðt  DtÞ þ
P
cxik
1
2 ðsikDtÞ where sik is the rate of change of
the storage of commodity k at node i. The constant termP
cxik xiðt  DtÞ is excluded from the objective function; in order
to obtain the total cost, including the full cost of storage, this term
can be added after optimisation. Substituting Eq. (3) for pik into Eq.
(11) gives the total cost:
C ¼
X
e2E
cfek f
e
k þ
X
i2V
cxik
1
2
ðsikDtÞ þ
X
i2V
cpik p
i
kk þ
X
i2V
ain;kj
i
kk
 !
þ
X
i2V
c/ik /
i
k þ
X
i2V
ckik k
i
k; ð13Þ
To minimise the total cost the optimisation problem can thus be
formulated as:min z ¼
X
e2E
cfek f
e
k þ
X
i2V
cxik
1
2
ðsikDtÞ þ
X
i2V
cpik p
i
kk þ
X
i2V ;n–k
ain;kj
i
nk
 !
þ
X
i2V
c/ik /
i
k þ
X
i2V
ckik k
i
k; 8k 2 K; and 8e 2 E; and 8i 2 V
ð14Þ
subject to general constraints:
ðf i k  f i!k Þ þ pikk þ
X
n–k
ainkj
i
nk þ kik 
X
n–k
jikn
 !
 ðsik þ /ikÞ
¼ ji k 8k 2 K and 8i 2 V ð15Þ
sik þ /ik P
xi;maxk xik
Dt
; 8i 2 V and 8k 2 K ð16Þ
pik;k þ
X
m–k
aim;kj
i
m;k 6 p
i;max
k ; 8i 2 V and 8k 2 K ð17Þ
and variable bounds:
0 6 fe 6 fmaxe ; 8e 2 E ð18Þ
0 6 pikk; 8i 2 V and 8k 2 K ð19Þ
0 6 jink;8i 2 V and 8k 2 K and 8n 2 K and 8n–k ð20Þ
x
i
k
Dt
6 sik 6
xi;maxk xik
Dt
; 8i 2 V and 8k 2 K ð21Þ
0 6 /ik; 8i 2 V and 8k 2 K ð22Þ
0 6 kik 6 ji k ; 8i 2 V and 8k 2 K ð23Þ
where fmaxe is the maximum ﬂow capacity of an edge.
3.5.2. Objective function and constraints: normal conditions
Under normal conditions, when storage is not used and dis-
charge and unsatisﬁed demand do not occur, the above general for-
mulation can be signiﬁcantly simpliﬁed. Variables representing
storage, discharge and shortage can be excluded from the analysis.
Thus, the objective function and the constraints become:
min z ¼
X
e2E
cfek f
e
k þ
X
i2V
cpik p
i
kk þ
X
i2V
ain;kj
i
kk
 !
; ð24Þ
subject to general constraints:
f i k  f i!k
 þ pikk þX
n–k
ainkj
i
nk 
X
n–k
jikn
 !
¼ ji k ð25Þ
pik;k þ
X
m–k
aim;kj
i
m;k 6 pimaxk ð26Þ
and variable bounds:
0 6 fe 6 fmaxe ; 8e 2 E ð27Þ4. Example
The application of the proposed model is illustrated by a hypo-
thetical example that simulates the interactions between several
energy system and water system components, shown in Fig. 3.
The energy system is represented by an electricity substation
(node 1), which is connected by power lines to a water tower (node
3) and several other electricity ‘consumers’, including a residential
area (node 4), two nursing homes (node 5) and a community
1 
2 3 
4 
5 
6 
Fig. 3. Network model of considered infrastructure. Nodes: node 1 – electricity
substation; node 2 – water treatment plant; node 3 – water tower; node 4 –
residential area; node 5 – nursing homes; node 6 – community hospital. Edges:
water pipes (solid lines); power lines (dashed lines).
R. Holden et al. / Safety Science 53 (2013) 51–60 57hospital (node 6). In addition to the water tower, the water system
includes a water treatment plant (node 2). Thus, ﬂows of two com-
modities – electricity supplied by the electricity substation (whose
maximum capacity is assumed to be 2000 kW h/day) and water
supplied by the water treatment plant (with maximum capacity
of 100 m3/day) – are considered. The three main consumer nodes
– the residential area, the two nursing homes and the community
hospital – have daily demands that are given in Table 1.
The water tower, which requires electricity for pumping water
into the tower, is a form of transhipment node in the water system;
we assume that 1 kW h is consumed to pump 7.5 m3 of water. The
tower capacity is 160 m3, i.e., it contains double the daily demand
of water. It is also assumed that the water tower, each of the nurs-
ing homes, and the hospital, have the same kind of emergency die-
sel generators. Each generator has a power of 12 kW, a storage tank
for 100 l of fuel, and can produce 3 kW h per litre of consumed die-
sel. Thus, diesel fuel is a third commodity included in the example,
although its ﬂow is not simulated. However, this can be done with
the proposed model, for example, if the transport system (i.e.,
roads) is also considered.
The costs of ﬂow, storage, production and shortage do not rep-
resent actual costs and are assigned to ensure that the commodi-
ties are distributed between the consumers as intended. For
example, in order to prevent the use of stored commodities (i.e.,
water and fuel), until there is no other way to meet demands,
the costs of their storage are set negative. It is also assumed that
the community hospital has the highest priority in receiving re-
quired commodities, followed by the nursing homes and then the
residential area. The costs of shortages of water and electricity
for these consumers are set accordingly, i.e., the highest costs for
the hospital, a lower costs for the nursing home and the lowest
ones for the residential area.
The performance of this infrastructure network, subject to a
natural hazard (e.g., ﬂood), is simulated. It is assumed that the nat-
ural hazard partially damages the production capacities of the elec-
tricity substation and the water treatment plant. This is taken into
account by treating these capacities as random variables which are
described by beta distributions deﬁned on the interval (0, pimaxk ),
where p1max1 ¼ 2000 kW h/day is the maximum production capac-
ity of the electricity substation and p2max2 ¼ 120 m3/day of theTable 1
Electricity and water demands.
Consumer Demands
Electricity (kW h/day) Water (m3/day)
Residential area 1200 45
Nursing homes 400 25
Community hospital 200 10water treatment plant, respectively. It is also assumed that the
means of the random variables are equal to pimaxk =2, and coefﬁ-
cients of variations equal to 0.40. It is worth noting, again, that
the example is purely hypothetical; the above assumptions are
made for illustrative purposes only.
Generally, natural hazards may damage infrastructure compo-
nents that are represented by nodes and edges, resulting in partial
or full failure, which may be taken into account in the model in a
number of ways. The infrastructure network will function in a par-
tially damaged condition until the production capacities of the
electricity substation and the water treatment plant will be re-
stored, which may take several days. The example examines what
happens with the services provided by the infrastructure (i.e., sup-
ply of electricity and water to the consumers) when it takes up to
10 days to restore these capacities. The analysis is carried out using
a daily time step (Dt = 1 day). There are a number of parameters
characterising the performance of the infrastructure that have
been estimated. However, results for only one parameter (relative
satisﬁed demand) are presented herein. For the commodity k at
node i the latter is deﬁned as (1 kik=ji k ) – i.e., when it equals
unity the demand is fully satisﬁed and when it is zero the node re-
ceives none of the commodity.
The results (shown in Figs. 4 and 5) are obtained by Monte Carlo
simulation and are presented in terms of the expected value and
standard deviation of the relative satisﬁed demand for the three
consuming nodes: residential area (i = 4); nursing homes (i = 5);
and community hospital (i = 6); and two commodities: electricity
(k = 1); and water (k = 2). As can be seen, the community hospital
is well protected in the case when the production capacities of
the electricity substation and the water treatment plant are par-
tially damaged. It will continue to receive the required electricity
and water supply with very little disruption, even if 10 days are re-
quired to restore the damaged capacities. The nursing homes are
reasonably protected. During the ﬁrst 2 days after the damage their
demand for electricity and water will be fully satisﬁed, after that at
around 90%, but with relatively high uncertainty (the correspond-
ing standard deviations are greater than 0.2). As expected, the res-
idential area is the least protected. Its water demand will be
satisﬁed in full only for a day after the damage while the supply
of electricity will drop immediately. In 3 days its supply of electric-
ity will be reduced on average to about 40% of demand, and water
to 50%, with very high uncertainty – i.e., if it will take more than
3 days to restore the electricity substation and the water treatment
plant, then it is highly probable that the residential area will re-
ceive almost no electricity and water.5. Discussion
The purpose of our model is to simulate commodity ﬂows with-
in local communities, especially during times when infrastructual
damage has resulted from a natural hazard. Since highly accurate
prediction of the extent of damage is not possible, uncertainties
regarding damaged infrastructures require consideration. To
achieve this, various infrastructure parameters (e.g., maximum
production capacities at nodes, maximum ﬂow capacities of edges)
are treated as random variables. These properties, in principle,
make the model suitable for probabilistic analysis.
In Section 2, a number of different approaches to modelling the
performance of a single infrastructure system and interconnected
infrastructure systems have been discussed. Based on this discus-
sion, it is clear that network models are the most suitable for our
purposes. However, taking into account the scale of infrastructure
networks at the community level, and the need to obtain ﬂows of
commodities at each node, the models applied to the topological
analysis of ‘vulnerability’ in large-scale networks are of little rele-
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Fig. 4. Relative satisﬁed demand of electricity: (a) expected value; (b) standard deviation.
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Fig. 5. Relative satisﬁed demand of water: (a) expected value; (b) standard deviation.
58 R. Holden et al. / Safety Science 53 (2013) 51–60vance to the current work. Furthermore, computational efﬁciency
matters. Restrictions on the computational time required for an
analysis therefore prevent (or, more correctly, make very difﬁcult)
the use of infrastructure-speciﬁc models where the ﬂow of com-
modities involve non-linear equations. Given the number (this de-
pends on the probabilistic technique used) of iterations required,
along with the fact that non-linear models would add complexity
to the model description (individual infrastructure systems would
require speciﬁc equations) a linear formulation was adopted.
Thus, the model we present should be seen as a reasonable
compromise, between computational efﬁciency and accuracy, gi-
ven that traditional network ﬂow models are still used for analysis
of individual infrastructures. The model has a number of desirable
features, as follows: it is capable of providing very high resolution;
it can account for storage of commodities that are drawn on in
times of crisis; it is time dependent, which is important for simu-
lating the performance of infrastructures during processes of dam-
age and repair; it can also represent different infrastructure
systems as a single network, which simpliﬁes the modelling of
interdependencies; computationally efﬁciency allows probabilistic
analysis of local networks, as is demonstrated with Monte Carlo
simulation. On the other hand, the model has the following limita-
tions: it is not useful when the performance of large-scale infra-
structure systems is of interest – e.g., cascading failures in large-
scale electrical (or water) networks not only because it would in-
volve very long computational times, but because the ﬂow of com-
modities is simulated in a simpliﬁed manner. Thus vulnerabilityassessment of large-scale networks is not possible; it is a linear
model and, therefore, predictions of commodity ﬂows, which in
reality involve nonlinearities, may not be highly accurate (further
discussion on the accuracy of linear models may be found in a
number of publications citied in Section 2.1).
Finally, the formulation of the model as a linear optimisation
problem (where the objective function represents the total cost
of ﬂow, storage, production and shortage of commodities) serves
two purposes. When the cost values in the analysis represent ac-
tual costs associated with these activities (i.e., production costs,
ﬁnes for unmet demand as shortage costs, etc.) the model can be
used to optimise the infrastructure performance in purely eco-
nomic terms. However, when the distribution of commodities dur-
ing disruptions caused by natural hazards is of interest, notional
costs representing the preferences of a decision-maker may be em-
ployed. This is a mechanism that allows choices regarding the allo-
cation of resources between various consumers to be made, as the
example simulation in Section 4 demonstrates.
6. Further model development
As this suggests, one of the main intentions is to explore the
network ﬂow model in the context of real, weather-related haz-
ards. This will be achieved, initially, by coupling it to a ﬂood model.
The coupling could be achieved by using a geographical informa-
tion system (GIS) to link to an existing ﬂood models. Once aug-
mented with spatial data, the infrastructure nodes and
Fig. 6. Modelling components. The street map (top right), not including network overlay, is included with permission (Cityvisions by Paul Holland, www.cityvisions.co.uk).
R. Holden et al. / Safety Science 53 (2013) 51–60 59connections should be overlaid with a ﬂood plain. Then it will be
possible to compare the ﬂood depths at nodes to model thresholds
or known failure thresholds; information, where available, will be
obtained – e.g., substations should be resilient to a ﬂood depth of
300 mm, (NGE, 2010). Existing models of node failure within infra-
structure systems tend to rely on the random selection of nodes. In
real hazard situations, however, it is unlikely that such methods re-
ﬂect real processes. This is certainly true for ﬂood situations where
vulnerable areas – e.g., with small heights above the water table –
are often unevenly distributed, and better represented by models
that capture topographical features.
Similarly, over the longer-term, we would like to allow the
infrastructure model to be exploited in the context of other weath-
er-related hazards. We illustrate the components of the intended
approach in Fig. 6. In the short-term we will be developing our ap-
proach at two test sites within the UK, but the intention is that the
tool can be deployed in any given region.7. Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a network ﬂowmodel that has
at its heart a general node model. Any number of different infra-
structures can thus be conceived of as a single graph, which incor-
porates representations of infrastructural interdependencies. The
novel aspects of the model relate to the integration, at the nodes,
of processes – consumption, production and storage – important
at the community scale in times of crisis. We have demonstrated
the potential of the model by providing an example application
involving two infrastructures and three commodity types, in terms
of the controlled supply of two of those types to consumer nodes of
varying vulnerability. The example demonstrates how the model
might be used with respect to the prioritised control of commodity
ﬂows. In the future, we envision that such a model can be applied
by stakeholders – e.g. managers of community infrastructure;engineers concerned with the protection of public and private as-
sets in the local community; emergency response units – in local
communities throughout the UK. We have outlined some future
directions of our research that will support this development.Acknowledgements
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